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ESSAY
THE LATEST REVENUE GENERATOR:
STOCK SALES BY PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS FRANCHISES
ScoTr C. LASCARi*
I. INTRODUCTION
For years, professional sports teams have engaged in a variety of
strategies to increase revenues and thereby compete with and thrive
against other teams and other sports leagues. To accomplish this goal,
teams have moved from one city to another,' have convinced their home
cities to build or help finance new stadiums,2 have renegotiatied their
stadium and arena leases,3 and have potentially circumvented their
league's rules and policies.4 Another trend has now appeared on the
horizon: selling stock in professional franchises.
Selling the stock of a professional sports franchise is not a recent ven-
ture. In fact, the Green Bay Packers of the National Football League
(NFL) sold their first share of stock back in 1923.1 Moreover, numerous
* B.S., summa cum laude, Marquette University, 1994; J.D., cum laude, Marquette Uni-
versity Law School, 1997. Attorney-At-Law, Rivkin, Radler & Kremer (Chicago, Illinois).
The author would like to thank God for his experiences, his family and friends for their love,
his firm for its support, his educators for their knowledge, and everyone else who helped turn
a concept into this article. Any views expressed are those of the author and not those of his
firm or its clients.
1. Examples include the Dallas Stars (formerly the Minnesota North Stars) and Colorado
Avalanche (formerly the Quebec Nordiques) of the National Hockey League (NHL), as well
as the Oakland (formerly Oakland and Los Angeles, respectively) Raiders, the St. Louis (for-
merly Los Angeles) Rams, the Baltimore Ravens (formerly Cleveland Browns) and the Ten-
nessee (formerly Houston) Oilers of the National Football League (NFL).
2. Examples include the Cincinnati Reds and Milwaukee Brewers of Major League Base-
ball (MLB), the Miami Heat and Washington Wizards of the National Basketball Association
(NBA), the Washington Redskins of the NFL, and the Florida Panthers and Washington
Capitals of the NHL.
3. Examples include the New Jersey Devils of the NHL and the San Diego Chargers of
the NFL.
4. Examples include the Dallas Cowboys and New England Patriots of the NFL, each of
whom benefited from advertising deals with their stadiums, which would potentially contra-
dict the NFL's rules on revenue sharing.
5. See History (visited Feb. 5, 1998) <http://www.packers.comlhistory/stockhistory.html>.
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sports franchises have indirectly sold their stock on the market as part of
larger corporations for years. For example, ITT Corporation owns both
the New York Knicks of the National Basketball Association (NBA) and
the New York Rangers of the National Hockey League (NHL) (New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) symbol: IT?); Turner Broadcasting con-
trols both the Atlanta Braves of Major League Baseball (MLB) and the
Atlanta Hawks of the NBA (American Stock Exchange symbol: TBS.B);
Walt Disney Company possesses complete control over the Anaheim
Might Ducks of the NHL and partial control over the Anaheim Angels
of MLB (NYSE symbol: DIS); the Tribune Company owns the Chicago
Cubs of MLB, the television station (WGN-TV) that broadcasts a major-
ity of Cubs' games, and the newspaper (the Chicago Tribune) that covers
Cubs' games (NYSE symbol: TRB); COMSAT Corporation controls
both the Colorado Avalanche of the NHL and the Denver Nuggets of
the NBA (NYSE symbol: CQ), which make up about 13% of the com-
pany's overall value;6 and Rupert Murdoch's News Corp. (NYSE sym-
bol: NWSPR) recently purchased the Los Angeles Dodgers of MLB. 7
Increasingly, however, teams are approaching the public directly with
stock offers.8 Since the type of "stock" and the corresponding risks and
benefits vary from one franchise to the next, each leads the potential
purchaser to ask: Is this a sound investment or scam?
II. AN ANALYSIS OF STOCK SALES
Considering the number of direct and indirect sports stock partici-
pants, it would be a daunting task to analyze each stock sale related to
professional sports franchises. This article does not purport to accom-
plish such a goal. Rather, this article reviews the stock sales of four pro-
fessional sports franchises in four different professional sports leagues
and analyzes the viability of this latest revenue generator.
A. The Green Bay Packers
We begin our discussion with the Green Bay Packers of the NFL for
two reasons. First, the Packers initiated the process of stock sales by
6. See Tom Nawrocki, 96/02/26-Wanna Buy A Celtic? (visited Jan. 26, 1999) <http://www.
worth.com/articles/WO226Naw.html>.
7. See Tim Jones & Phil Rogers, Indians' Owner Turns to Wall Street with Eye on Browns,
Cm. Tian., Mar. 28, 1998, § 4, at 1.
8. For example, the Toronto Maple Leafs of the NHL are a publicly traded company in
Canada. See Kevin B. Blackistone, Boston Celtics Courting Investment Community, THE DAL-
LAs MoRmNI NEWS, Dec. 9, 1986, at ID.
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professional franchises back in 1923. Second, the Packers sit on one end
of the revenue generator's spectrum.
1. The History
Stock sales and the Green Bay Packers go back over 75 years, to
1923. That year, the Packers sold 1,000 shares of stock 9 for $5.00 per
share and the understanding that each buyer would simultaneously
purchase at least six season tickets.10 The stock sale coincided with the
organization of the corporate predecessor to the Packers' present com-
pany, Green Bay Packers, Inc. (the "Corporation")." On January 26,
1935, that predecessor entered into receivership and was reorganized as
a Wisconsin, nonprofit, stock corporation. 2 At the same time, the Cor-
poration raised $15,000.00 in new capital through the sale of three hun-
dred shares of stock.' 3
The Packers' third stock sale occurred in 1950, when the Corpora-
tion's officers amended its bylaws. 4 Through those amendments, the
Corporation was permitted to sell up to a cumulative level of 10,000
shares of stock; individual investors were prohibited from owning more
than 200 shares; and the size of the Board of Directors increased from 15
to 25 members.'5 The Packers sold the newly authorized individual
shares of stock for $25.00 each, and sales generated roughly $118,000.00
in new Corporation capital. 6 As of November 1, 1997, 4,627 shares of
stock, known as the Original Shares, were outstanding.' 7 On November
13, 1997, therefore, the Corporation's stockholders approved amend-
ments to the Articles of Incorporation, thereby authorizing the issuance
of up to 10,000,000 shares of common stock. In addition, the Corpora-
tion reclassified the Original Shares on a 1,000-for-1 basis, leaving
4,627,000 shares outstanding prior to the 1997 sale.' Without further
9. While shares are called "stock," none of the shares sold by the Packers, both in the past
and in the present, conform to "stock" in the common sense and as regulated by the Securities
and Exchange Commission.
10. See History, supra note 5.
11. See GREEN BAY PACKERS, INC., 1997 COMMON STOCK OFFERING DoCUMNTrr 2 (Nov.
14, 1997) [hereinafter STOCK OFFElRING DocuMENr].
12. See id- at 2.
13. See History, supra note 5.
14. See id
15. See id
16. See id
17. See STOCK OFErING DoCUMENT, supra note 11, at 7.
18. See id
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amendments to the bylaws, the Corporation could now sell up to
5,373,000 shares of stock.
2. The Fourth Stock Sale
In November of 1997, the Green Bay Packers announced that they
would hold their fourth stock sale in the Corporation's history. The Cor-
poration announced that it elected to sell the additional shares of stock
after considering the great changes in NFL economics following the 1950
sale.19 Since 1985 alone, the Packers spent $50 million improving
Lambeau Field (the Packers home stadium), adding on to its administra-
tive building, and constructing an indoor practice facility known as the
Don Hutson Center.20 In addition, each facility requires continuous
maintenance and modification, and Lambeau Field itself, already forty
years old, rapidly progresses toward the time when it must be replaced in
its entirety.21
Unlike other clubs whose owners have substantial assets upon
which they can draw to provide the needed capital for facilities,
the Packers do not have a ready source of capital for significant
capital improvements or an 'owner's contribution' to a public/pri-
vate partnership to renovate or replace the [Packers'] facilities.22
As a result, individual purchases of Packers' stock constitute contribu-
tions to the Corporation's capital assets. All proceeds from the stock
sale were to be deposited in a segregated capital improvements fund es-
tablished by the Corporation. Any and all withdrawals from that fund
may be used only for stadium and other capital improvements and are
subject to NFL oversight?23
Each share of stock offered during the fourth sale carried a purchase
price of $200.00 plus a handling fee of $15.00 per shareholder account.24
The Packers' intended to sell up to 400,000 shares initially, although the
Corporation was authorized to offer up to 1,000,000 shares and reserved
the right to increase the size of the offering at any time and without
further notice.25 The public offering was to last until January 31, 1998,
19. See id. at 3.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. STOCK OFFERiNo DocUmENT, supra note 11, at 3.
23. See id.
24. The Corporation would only authorize the sale of whole shares. See id. at 6.
25. See id. at 1, 6. Under the intended offering, holders of the new shares of common
stock would possess less than an 8% interest in the team. See id. at 5. For the Corporation to
issue more than the 1,000,000 authorized but unissued shares, 70% of the stockholders would
need to approve. See id. at 7.
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subject to extension, or until it became fully subscribed, whichever oc-
curred first. 6 The stock could only be sold or otherwise delivered to
natural persons, and each stock certificate could be registered, at most,
in the names of two people. 7 Buyers could not purchase more than 200
of the offered shares, and any stockholder already owning 200,000 shares
could not purchase any of the 1997 shares.' In addition, all potential
purchasers had to represent that they had not: 1) been involved in any
litigation in which it was alleged that they committed fraud, 2) been con-
victed of a felony, or 3) participated in sports gambling such as
"bookmaking." 29
What did stock purchasers receive for their money? On the one
hand, "[p]urchasers of Common Stock will... become a part of the Pack-
ers' tradition and legacy[,]" and are entitled to receive a stock certifi-
cate. The Packers will also notify all stockholders of the team's annual
meeting, but stockholders will only receive copies of the team's annual
report upon request.31 At the annual meeting, stockholders may cast
one vote per owned share and may do so only on matters submitted to
stockholder vote.32 Amendments to the Corporation's Articles of Incor-
poration, for example, require a two-thirds vote of all stockholder
shares.33
On the other hand, buyers cannot and should not purchase shares of
Packer stock with the intention of making a profit. The Corporation re-
peatedly warned prospective purchasers that the stock did not constitute
a standard investment, and shares cannot earn a financial return. In fact,
the Corporation's Restated Articles of Incorporation specifically state
that no shareholder may receive a dividend or any other monetary profit
by virtue of being a stockholder 4.3  Rather, the Corporation must place
any and all profits within a capital reserve or otherwise donate them to
certain charitable causes .3  Further, the Original Articles of Incorpora-
tion provide that if the Green Bay Packers' franchise is ever sold, follow-
26. See STOCK OFFERING DocumENT, supra note 11, at 6. The Packers eventually
changed the last day of the stock offering from January 31, 1998, to March 16, 1998.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 6, 7. As of November 14, 1997, around 1,900 stockholders held the Original
Shares, with two stockholders retaining the maximum 200,000 Original Shares.
29. Id. at 7.
30. Id. at 3.
31. See STOCK OFFERING DocumEENT, supra note 11, at 5.
32. See id. at 8.
33. See id.
34. Id. at 2.
35. See iUL
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ing the payment of all expenses, any remaining funds go to the
Sullivan-Wallen Post of the American Legion "to build 'a proper sol-
dier's memorial.'" 3 6 Moreover, stock purchases do not constitute chari-
table contributions and do not, therefore, entitle shareholders to tax
deductions or other economic benefits.3 7 In sum, it is virtually impossi-
ble for anyone to realize a profit from the purchase of Green Bay Pack-
ers' stock. 8
Aside from the inability to profit from the stock, purchasers are not
protected by either federal or state securities laws, and the shares are not
registered under the Securities Act of 1933 or under any Blue Sky Law
(state securities law). 9 Similarly, the shares were not approved by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),40 and the offer was not
valid outside of the United States.4'
Further, investors cannot sell, assign, pledge, or otherwise transfer
their share(s) of stock to anyone except to the Corporation and at a
price substantially less than the issuance price.4' Should any stockholder
propose to improperly sell or otherwise transfer shares to a third party,
the Corporation reserves the right, but not the obligation, to repurchase
the stock for 2.50 per share.43 Shares may only be transferred to mem-
bers of the stockholder's immediate family by gift or following death.44
All of these provisions coincide with the NFL's Constitution and Bylaws,
which prohibit the selling, assignment, or other transfer of interests in
NFL memberships without the prior approval of the NFL, except to im-
mediate family members by gift or through death.' In addition, trans-
fers to family members may only occur upon approval of the Executive
Committee.46 Along with each permissible transfer or separate registra-
tion of the Common Stock, the Corporation may impose a fee, currently
$6.00 but subject to future adjustments.47 The Corporation may also re-
36. History, supra note 5.
37. See STOCK OFFRNo DocumETwr, supra note 11, at 4, 5.
38. See id. at 1.
39. See id. at 4.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 7.
42. See STOCK OFFERING DocuMENT, supra note 11, at 4. An entity, on the other hand,
may transfer shares of common stock to certain individuals meeting the Corporation's ap-
proval. See id. at 8.
43. See id. at 2, 4.
44. See id. at 5. Immediate family refers to the spouse, child, mother, father, brother(s),
sister(s), or any lineal descendant of the stockholder. See id.
45. See id.
46. See History, supra note 5.
47. See STOCK OFFERINo DocumENT, supra note 11, at 8.
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deem shares of stock if: 1) the Board of Directors cannot locate a stock-
holder, 2) the Corporation expends reasonable time and effort
attempting to locate the missing stockholder, and 3) five years have
elapsed since the stockholder's last contact with the Corporation.4"
In addition to the Packers' restrictions on the stock's privileges and
transferability, NFL Rules specifically prohibit stockholders of NFL
clubs from engaging in conduct detrimental to the NFL's welfare. Con-
duct detrimental to the NFL's welfare includes: 1) having a financial in-
terest in another NFL club or professional football organization;
2) loaning money to any NFL football official, to other NFL clubs, or to
any player, coach, or employee thereof; 3) paying any NFL player or
coach; 4) acting as an agent for any NFL player; or 5) publicly criticizing
any NFL football official, any NFL club, its management, or any player,
coach, or employee thereof.49 Should the NFL Commissioner rule that a
stockholder engaged in conduct detrimental to the NFL, the Commis-
sioner may fine an offending shareholder up to $500,000.00 and/or re-
quire that shareholder to sell his or her share(s) of stock."0 If the
Commissioner finds that a stockholder bet on the outcome or score of
any NFL game, the Commissioner may fine the stockholder up to
$5,000.00 and/or require the stockholder to sell his or her stock.5'
3. Results of the Sale
Prior to the stock sale, the Packers conceded to the NFL's demands
and reluctantly released their estimate of total anticipated stock sales.
According to a survey taken in July of 1996, the public would purchase
upwards of 1,000,000 shares of Packer stock.5 z Based on that estimate,
the Packers' initially offered 400,000 shares and reserved the right to in-
crease the number of offered shares.5 3
The only problem: "there is a limit to Packermania."54 On March 17,
1998, the Packers announced that they had sold roughly 120,000 shares
48. See id at 5.
49. See id.
50. See id. The current Commissioner of the NFL is Paul Tagliabue.
51. See icl.
52. See Tom Silverstein, Packers Happy with Stock Sale, but 120,000 Shares Sold Falls
Short of Goal, MILWAUKEE J. SE-NTINEL, Mar. 18, 1998, at C1.
53. See STocK O 1nIG DocunmNT, supra note 11, at 1, 6. Under the intended offering,
holders of the new shares of common stock would possess less than an 8% interest in the
team. See id. at 5. For the Corporation to issue more than the 1,000,000 authorized but unis-
sued shares, 70% of the stockholders would need to approve. See id. at 7.
54. Silverstein, supra note 52, at C1.
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of stock, taking in more than $24 million.5 Over the course of the 17-
week sale, 182,000 people requested stock applications over the phone,
with an unidentified number doing the same via the Packer's Internet
site. 6 After the sale, however, only between 33% and 50% of those
requesting offering documents, roughly 75,000 people, ordered at least
one share of stock.5 7 Despite the tempered sales, the final results
pleased Packer officials. The $24 million influx doubled the team's fi-
nancial reserves and virtually assured that the team would remain afloat
for the next twenty-five years.5 8 Not a bad result considering the Pack-
ers needed NFL approval and were under SEC scrutiny to ensure that
buyers knew that they were not purchasing a profitable stock. This re-
sult does mean, however, that the Packers cannot contribute as much as
they had hoped to a new stadium in twenty to twenty-five years.59
B. The Boston Celtics
We continue with a quick discussion about the Boston Celtics of the
NBA. In 1986, the Celtics became the first NBA team to sell team stock
to the public (NYSE symbol: BOS).
1. The Sale
The Boston Celtics publicly sold their first shares of stock in 1986,
under the name Boston Celtics Limited Partnership (the "Partnership"),
for $17.50 per share.6 The offering represented a 40% ownership stake
in the team, the reigning NBA champion at the time of the offering.6 1
As of February 26, 1998, the Celtics remained the only NBA team
whose stock was trading on the open market.62 Approximately 5.3 mil-
lion shares are presently outstanding, with about 50,000 shareholders
owning a single share.63
55. See id.
56. Id. at C7.
57. See id. Purchasers of the stock were located in all 50 states, Guam and the United
States Virgin Islands. Wisconsin residents purchased the most shares (64,300) followed by
Illinois (9,600), Minnesota (4,300), California (3,700), and Florida (2,900). Residents in Texas,
home of the Dallas Cowboys, purchased 2,550 shares. See id.
58. Id.
59. See Silverstein, supra note 52, at C7.
60. See Nawrocki, supra note 6, at 1.
61. See Blackistone, supra note 8, at 1D.
62. See Nawrocki, supra note 6.
63. See Boston Celtics L.P. (last modified Jan. 29, 1999) <http://biz.yahoo.com/profiles/
bos.html>; see also Nawrocki, supra note 6.
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2. Benefits of Purchase
The benefits of purchasing Boston Celtic stock differ in some re-
spects from those granted by the Green Bay Packers. Like the Packers,
shareholder privileges include stock certificates and annual reports,
which the Partnership automatically distributes to stockholders. Simi-
larly, Celtic stockholders possess no true power over how the Partner-
ship is run.' 4 The biggest difference between the Celtics and the Packers
lies in the one additional privilege granted to Celtic stock owners: an
annual dividend.65 A dividend results from the distribution of current or
accumulated earnings to a corporation's shareholders on a pro rata basis,
based on the number of shares the stockholder owns. Companies typi-
cally distribute cash dividends, though they may come in other forms.66
Dividends also represent a return on investment, something the Packers
stock does not. The General Partner determines the amount of any and
all future Celtics distributions based, among other things, on the avail-
able resources and needs of the Partnership. For example, the Partner-
ship paid a $1.50 dividend on July 21, 1995.67
The revenue earned by the Partnership arises principally from the
sale of Boston Celtics home game tickets, as well as the licensing of tele-
vision, cable network, and radio broadcast rights.6" The Partnership can
determine a large portion of its revenue and expenses at the commence-
ment of each NBA season, based on season ticket sales and player and
broadcasting contracts. 69 In general, the Partnership typically exper-
iences a loss in the first quarter, which ends on September 30th of each
year. The explanation is not poor management but simply that the NBA
season begins in November, almost two months later, meaning the Part-
nership collects little revenue but still incurs substantial general and ad-
ministrative expenses. 70 After the first quarter, the Partnership
recognizes roughly one-third of its revenues in the second quarter, one-
half in the third quarter, and the remaining portion in the fourth quarter.
64. See Blackistone, supra note 8, at 1D.
65. See Boston Celtics Limited Partnership (visited Feb. 5, 1998) <http://www.oneshare.
com/products/celtics/>.
66. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 478 (6th ed. 1990). Another common form of divi-
dend is additional shares of stock in the company.
67. See BOSTON CELarCS LTD. PARTNERSn', 1996 3rd QUARTER Fomxi 10-Q, at 11 (Mar.
31, 1996) <http:llwww.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data8O5009OOOO910647-96-000060.txt> [herein-
after 1996 3rd QUARTER FoRm 10-Q].
68. See id. at 10.
69. See id. The Partnership recognizes actual revenue and expenses on a game-by-game
basis. See id.
70. See id.
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The Partnership similarly recognizes any and all playoff revenues and
expenses during the fourth quarter.71
To make Boston Celtic stock more attractive to purchasers, the Part-
nership engaged in a variety of activities, including investment opportu-
nities outside the NBA. As one example, the Partnership moved the
team's home games from the Boston Garden to the larger Fleet Center,
thereby gaining 4,200 additional seats and increased ticket revenues.72
The Partnership also "owned and operated [Boston] Radio Station
WEEI-590 AM until its sale on June 30, 1994.. ,,"7 In addition, the
Partnership "owned and operated.. .Television Station WFXT-Channel
25 of Boston, Massachusetts until its sale on July 7, 1995."17 As of
March 1996, the Partnership had not engaged in any negotiations relat-
ing to, nor made any commitments in connection with, any possible
acquisitions.75
C. The Florida Panthers
We continue our review with an analysis of the Florida Panthers of
the NHL. Florida Panther Holdings, Inc. (the "Company") represents a
more conventional investment, along with the accompanying benefits
and risks. Stock was first issued by the Company as an initial public
offering in November of 1996 at $10.00 a share.76
1. The Sales
The Company first sold Class A Common Stock through an Initial
Public Offering (IPO) on November 13, 1996, on NASDAQ (stock sym-
bol "PUCK"). 7 7 At that time, the team sold 2.7 million shares at a price
71. See iL at 10.
72. See 1996 3rd QUARTER FoRm 10-Q, supra note 67, at 11. Boston Celtics fans wait
about 15 years for season tickets to become available, although the team does sell 2,000 tickets
on a game-by-game basis. See Boston Celtics Limited Partnership, supra note 65. It therefore
appears that revenues from the sale of game tickets will not, at least in the short term, be
lacking.
73. 1996 3rd QUARTER FoRm 10-Q, supra note 67, at 9.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 11.
76. See Mark Weaver, The Daily Double (visited Feb. 26, 1997) <http://www.fool.com/
Ddouble/1997/Ddouble970226.html>.
77. See FLORIDA PANTHERs HOLDINGS, INc., 1996 FoRm 10-Q 5 (Dec. 31, 1996) <http://
www.sec.govlArchives/edgar/data/1020905/0000950144-97-00494.txt> [hereinafter 1996 FoRM
10-Q].
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of $10.00 per share.78 The stock hit the market with momentum to start,
however, opening at $11.50. 79 The only problem is that fans of the team
could not buy individual shares. Instead, all investors were required to
buy at least a block, or 100 shares, and were not allowed to purchase
more than 1,000 shares.80 The net proceeds of the IPO approximated
$66.3 million, of which $45 million was used to repay the company's out-
standing debt under the two term loans used to pay the Florida Panther's
franchise cost; the remaining $21.3 million was to be used for general
working capital.8'
In the summer of 1997, the Panthers announced that they would be
offering 6,780,135 shares of Class A common stock on the NYSE (Stock
symbol "PAW"). 2 Following the second offering, the Company would
have over 34 million shares of stock outstanding.8 3 The sale proceeds
were to be used to repay $76.1 million in debt that was assumed to
purchase a number of resort facilities, for possible future acquisitions,
and for working capital and other general corporate purposes.' In the
end, the Panthers stated that they were seeking to operate in two busi-
ness sections: (1) leisure and recreation and (2) sports and
entertainment.8 5
To accomplish that goal, the Company acquired all of the Partnership
interests in the Florida Panthers Hockey Club in exchange for 4,149,710
shares of Class A common stock and 255,000 shares of Class B common
stock.86 The Company also acquired all of the outstanding shares of
Decoma Investment, Inc. I and II, and approximately 78% of the part-
nership interests in Decoma Miami Associates, Limited-all for 870,968
shares of Class A common stock-which operates the Miami Arena, the
78. See id. In addition to the 2.7 million shares of Class A stock sold to the public, the
Company sold 4.6 million shares in a "Concurrent Offering" to a select group of individuals.
See id.
79. See Florida, Hockey Boosters Buy into Panthers Initial Offering, IwvESmm.Trr DEAL-
ERs' DIG., Nov. 18, 1996, at 19.
80. See Larry Lebowitz, Panthers Stock.- $1,000 Minimum; For IPO, You Must Buy 100
Shares, FORT LAuDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Sept. 26, 1996, at 1D.
81. See 1996 FoRM 10-Q, supra note 77, at 6.
82. See FLORIDA PANTHERS HOLDINGS, INC., 1997 PROSPECrUS 1 (Aug. 6, 1997) <http:l/
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/lO20905/0000950144-97-008552.txt> [hereinafter 1997 PRo-
spEcrus]. The stock moved from NASDAQ to the NYSE on July 11, 1997. See id. at 18.
83. See id. at 6.
84. See id. at 18.
85. See id. at 2-3.
86. See id. at 5-6. All of these shares were received by W. Wayne Huzienga, owner of the
Florida Panthers, in exchange for a $41,000,000.00 note owed to him by the Company. See id.
at 6.
1999]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
former home stadium to the Panthers as well as the current home of the
NBA's Miami Heat.87 Further, on December 22, 1996, the Company en-
tered into agreements resulting in direct and indirect ownership in both
the Hyatt Regency Pier 66 Resort and Marina (for 4,450,000 shares of
Class A common stock) and the Radisson Bahia Mar Beach Resort and
Yachting Center (for 3,950,000 shares of Class A common stock). The
Company has also purchased the Boca Raton Resort & Club; a majority
stake in the Rolling Hills Golf Course in Davie, Florida for $8 million in
cash; 8 a $288.5 million partnership stake in the Arizona Biltmore re-
sort09 in December of 1997, for $125 million in cash, $100 million in
Panthers' stock, and $63.5 million in debt, and the Company received an
option to buy all of the resort. The Arizona Biltmore resort will con-
tinue to be managed by the company's partner in the deal, Grossman
Co. Properties.9" In a statement, Wayne Huzienga said that the latest
purchase "validated 'our strategy of expansion from east to west operat-
ing premier, one-of-a-kind properties."'91
On July 8, 1997, the Company entered into a merger agreement with
Gary V. Chernoff and ResortHill, Inc., by which the Company will ac-
quire approximately a 68% interest in the Registry Hotel at Pelican
Bay.9
2
Moreover, the Company owns and operates Arena Development
Company, Limited, formed for the purpose of developing the Broward
County Civic Arena,93 as well as Arena Operating Company, Ltd., which
will manage and operate the arena.94 Broward County is funding all of
the construction costs of the Broward County Civic Arena, and the
87. See 1997 PRosPECTUs, supra note 82, at 6, 7.
88. See Antonio Fins, Panthers Buy Rolling Hills Golf Course to Serve Hotels, FORT LAU-
DERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Sept. 10, 1997, at ID. The course is well-known; it is where the
movie Caddyshack was filmed. It lies close to the Miami Dolphins practice facility and is used
by the players. The purchase includes a 27,000 square foot clubhouse, banquet, and meeting
rooms plus seven acres of undeveloped land next to the course. See id. The golf course is just
a "short ride" from the Bahia Mar and Pier 66 hotels. See id.
89. The Biltmore is located in the heart of Phoenix and is recognized as one of the finest
and most exclusive resorts in the region, complete with two golf courses, five swimming pools,
a 92-foot water slide, health spa, conference center, and five restaurants. See Acquisition;
Huzienga Buys Stake in Biltmore, TucsoN CrTIEN, Dec. 24, 1997, at 7C.
90. See id.
91. Id.
92. See 1997 PRospEcrUs, supra note 82, at 5.
93. The Broward County Civic Arena is the new home stadium for the Florida Panthers.
94. See 1996 FoRmi 10-Q, supra note 77, at 7.
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Company is only responsible for development costs exceeding $184.7
million.95
Aside from the other investments, the Company also owns a twin-
pad ice rink facility in Coral Springs, Florida, known as "Incredible Ice."
In addition, the Company operates an ice skating rink facility in Pom-
pano Beach, Florida pursuant to a lease. Both operations are open to
the public and derive revenues from, among other things: (1) fees
charged to the public, (2) food and beverage sales, and (3) retail sales.96
The Company has also said that it may "consider making additional
acquisitions of certain resort-related, sports-related or other types of
businesses" or commercial properties.97 Such acquisitions, however,
would mean a dilution of the Company's stock since such acquisitions
would be made in exchange for shares of the Company's stock.98
2. The Benefits and Risks of Purchase
The success of the Company depends, at least in part, on the success
of the Florida Panthers, their ticket revenue, the increase in players' con-
tracts, etc.99 Just like the Boston Celtics, the Company recognizes all
hockey-related revenues and expenses over the course of the season on a
per game basis.100 As a result, most of the Company's earnings and ex-
penses are recorded in the second and third quarters; all playoff reve-
nues and expenses will fall within the fourth quarter. In the Broward
County Civic Arena, the Company retains 95% of the revenue derived
from the sale of general seating to the Panthers' home games and 100%
of certain other hockey-related advertising and merchandising reve-
nue.10 1 The Company also receives the first $14 million of net operating
income'02 derived from the Broward County Civic Arena and 80% of all
net operating income in excess of $14 million.
Nevertheless, the Company has warned that there is no assurance it
will ever achieve a profitable level of operations or that profitability can
be sustained on an ongoing basis; that the company may require substan-
tial capital infusions on a continuing basis to finance operations and ex-
95. See id at 9.
96. See 1997 PROSPEcTuS, supra note 82, at 5.
97. Id. at 9.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 12-13.
100. See 1996 FoRM 10-Q, supra note 77, at 5.
101. See 1997 PROSPECTUs, supra note 82, at 4.
102. Net operating income includes income from the sale of luxury boxes, premium seat-
ing, and parking. See id.
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penses; and that the Company may have to restructure its debt, sell
material assets or operations, or obtain additional debt or equity.10 3 As
to the resort facilities, the Company notes that the resort facilities are all
subject to the operating risks that are common in the highly competitive
resort and hotel industry, and that the resort business is generally a sea-
sonal business.' °4 As for the Panthers themselves, the Panthers must
compete with other major league sports, college athletics, other sports-
related entertainment, and other entertainment and recreation activi-
ties. 105 Other risks associated with the hockey team include landing tal-
ented players, avoiding uninsured injuries, uncertain labor relations,
NHL stability and success, television contracts, and the completion and
success of the team's new home arena.106 Further, since the Miami Heat
of the NBA are moving to the Dade Arena and since the Panthers are
moving to the Broward County Civic Arena, the income derived from
the Decoma Company's Miami Arena will depend upon the signing of
other tenants. Losses may result, depending upon the Company's ability
to locate other tenants. 0 7
More like the Packers, however, the Panthers do not intend to pay
any dividends with respect to its common stock, at least in the near fu-
ture.108 The reason is simply that the NHL Bylaws preclude any of its
member clubs from paying cash dividends, unless doing so "will not im-
pair the member's ability to (i) meet its projected expenses for the ensu-
ing... [year] without the use of borrowed funds, other than short-term
borrowings, and (ii) maintain adequate reserves to fund the future pay-
ment of all deferred player compensation and other deferred obligations
for past services."' 0 9 The Bylaws further prevent the granting of a 5% or
more security interest in any of the Panther's assets or in any direct or
indirect ownership of the company without prior N-L approval, which
shall be withheld in the NHL's sole discretion. 110
One of the risks associated with purchasing a more diversified com-
pany is the risk of potentially more, and significantly larger, problems.
Such is indeed the case with the Florida Panthers. In one action, the
Miami Sports and Exhibition Authority sued major components of the
103. See id. at 8.
104. See id. at 10-11.
105. See id. at 12.
106. See 1997 PROSPECrus, supra note 82, at 13-17.
107. See id. at 13.
108. See id. at 10.
109. 1996 FoRM 10-Q, supra note 77, at 9.
110. See id.
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company alleging a restraint of trade in the South Florida sports and
entertainment facility market. The Company, however, believes that the
suit is without merit and intended to vigorously defend against it."' In
another action, the Company sued the Miami Sports and Exhibition Au-
thority seeking declaration of its rights under a license agreement, nego-
tiated by an independent contractor which was retained to enter into
agreements to use the Miami Arena. The District Court granted prelimi-
nary injunctive relief, holding that the Authority unreasonably withheld
consent to an amended agreement between the parties." 2 Also in Janu-
ary of 1997, the Company, through Arena Development, filed a lawsuit
claiming that Broward County's Prevailing Wage Ordinance did not ap-
ply to the construction of the Broward County Civic Arena. On Febru-
ary 21, 1997, the 17th Judicial Circuit ruled against the Company's
complaint, finding the Wage Ordinance to be applicable. The company
has appealed, but the Fourth District Court of Appeals of Florida af-
firmed the trial court's judgment and held that the prevailing wage ordi-
nance did apply." 3 The Company had stated that an unsuccessful appeal
may cost approximately $4.5 million." 4 In yet another lawsuit, disabled
minors and one of their fathers brought an action against the Panthers
and other groups, claiming that the Broward County Civic Arena, as
planned, would violate the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)." 5
A United States District Court denied Defendants' motions to
dismiss." 6
In still another matter, a class action lawsuit was filed against the
Company in January of 1997. In that suit, the Plaintiffs claim that the
Company and some senior officers of the Company issued an extraordi-
nary amount of negative comments and information regarding the Com-
pany's two to three year potential, and gave a false impression of the
Company's intended direction, in conjunction with the November 13,
1996, IPO.17 For example, the prospectus stated the stock "should not
be purchased with the expectation that the market performance of the
company will be comparable to the past performance of other companies
111. See 1997 PRosPEcrus, supra note 82, at 13.
112. See Florida Panthers Hockey Club. Ltd. v. Miami Sports & Exhibition Auth., 939 F.
Supp. 855 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
113. See Arena Dev. Co. v. Broward County, 708 So. 2d 976, 977 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1998).
114. See 1997 PRospEcrus, supra note 82, at 17.
115. See Johanson v. Huzienga Holdings, Inc. et al., 963 F.Supp. 1175 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
116. See id.
117. See Class Action Complaint 5, Susser v. Florida Panthers Holdings, Inc., No. 97-
6084-CIV-FERGUSON (S.D. Fla. 1997) [hereinafter Class Action Complaint].
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with which Mr. Huzienga has been involved[j" that "prospective pur-
chasers should be aware that investments in sports franchises have not
historically provided high rates of return compared to other investments
of similar risk[J""'  and that the Company would experience serious
problems generating cash flow until the Panthers moved to the Broward
County Civic Arena for the 1998-99 hockey season.119 As a result, the
Class sold their shares, believing this constituted a long-term investment,
while the Defendants made significant purchases of the Company's stock
at an artificially depressed price, close to $10.00 per share. 20 Then, on
December 22, 1996, the Company announced that it would purchase two
different resort properties and thereby become a leisure-time sports and
entertainment company.12  On December 23, 1996, the Company's
stock price rose 28%, and it rose another 33% on December 24, 1996,
reaching a record high of $17.00 per share. 22 Therefore, the Class
claimed that the Defendants acted fraudulently and deceitfully with re-
spect to the Class, resulting in substantial suffering on the part of the
Class members.' As with other lawsuits against it, the Company has
stated that it "intends to vigorously defend against this lawsuit.' 24
D. The Cleveland Indians
We conclude our review with an analysis of the Cleveland Indians of
MLB. Cleveland was the last of these teams to come on the scene with
respect to stock sales, but the documentation shows that the Indians
learned lessons from their predecessors. On March 27, 1998, it was an-
nounced that the Cleveland Indians would issue two classes of stock,
with Indians owner and Chairman Richard E. Jacobs maintaining control
over voting interest of the team.' 5 The team's announcement cited the
need "to raise cash for skyrocketing salaries, new stadiums, stadium im-
provements, and other ventures. ' 126 Through the offering, the Indians
are "the first free-standing team in professional baseball to go public."'127
118. These quotes were in capitalized, large, bold print in the original prospectus. See id.
26.
119. See id. 27.
120. See id. 5, 51.
121. See id. 33, 34.
122. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 117, 40.
123. See id. 47, 52.
124. 1997 PROSPECrUS, supra note 82, at 10.
125. See Jones & Rogers, supra note 7, at 1.
126. Id.
127. Id. at page 2.
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What follows is a close look at the offering put forth by Cleveland Indi-
ans Baseball Company, Inc. (the "Company").
1. The Offering
As a starting point, the Company offered 4,000,000 Class A Common
Shares to the public. "Substantially all of the proceeds will be used to
acquire partnership interests in Cleveland Indians Baseball Company
Limited Partnership from entities controlled by Richard E. Jacobs."' 28
The initial public offering price per share was between $14.00 and $16.00,
and the shares are listed on NASDAQ as "CLEV."'129 Upon completion
of the Offering, the Company's business will entail owning and operating
the Indians, managing Jacobs Field (the Indians' home ballpark), and
conducting related activities. 3 °
In order to succeed, the Company's strategy includes "dedication to a
strong player development system, effective player personnel manage-
ment, attention to quality and customer service and an integrated ap-
proach to marketing and licensing arrangements.' 13' The Company
feels that the team's long-term performance is crucial to the Company's
success, so "efforts to improve the Company's revenues and income
from period to period may be secondary to actions that management
believes will enhance long-term value.' 32 In addition, the Company
warns that both the Commissioner and the President of the American
League have authority to take actions in the best interests of MLB, ac-
tions that may not necessarily be in the best interests of the Company.133
2. The Benefits and Risks
First, the benefits, or lack thereof. In the foreseeable future, the
Company does not intend to pay dividends to holders of either Class A
or Class B Common Stock.13 Rather, the Company intends to retain all
future earnings for reinvestment into the business. 3 ' "Any future deter-
mination to pay cash dividends will be at the sole discretion of the Com-
128. CLEVELAND INDIANS BASEBALL CO., INC., 1998 PROSPECrUS 1 (1998) [hereinafter
1998 PROSPEcrus].
129. Id.
130. See id. at 13.
131. Id at 3.
132. Id. at 10.
133. See 1998 PROSPECrUS, supra note 128, at 10.
134. See id. at 15.
135. See id. at 19.
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pany's Board of Directors." '136 The Indians do not say anything about
the receipt of annual reports.
Turning to voting rights, each of the 4,000,000 Class A Common
Shares offered for sale to the public are entitled to a single vote.'37 Fol-
lowing the offering, Mr. Jacobs is the beneficial owner of 2,281,667 Class
B common Shares, each share being entitled to 10,000 votes. 138 Conse-
quently, Mr. Jacobs retained 99.88% of the Company's total voting con-
trol, meaning that he still controls the management and policies of the
Company, including the election of the entire Board of Directors, except
for certain charter amendments. 13 9 Even if Mr. Jacobs elected to sell the
team, MLB Ownership Guidelines require that an individual or group of
no more than 20 individuals maintain at least a 10% economic interest in
the Company and a 90% voting interest in the Company at all times.
We turn now to the risks. As with the other corporations, the Com-
pany's success depends somewhat on the team's performance. As an ex-
ample, the Company generally recognizes revenues and expenses on a
game-by-game basis. Since the MLB regular season typically begins in
late March or early April, the Company's first quarter will generally in-
clude limited revenues 4 ° and will reflect a loss attributable to fixed costs
incurred during the quarter.14' Generally, any post-season revenues will
be contained in the fourth quarter. 42
Whether the Indians will continue to bring people in the gates and
participate in the post season will, moreover, depend on the team's abil-
ity to find or obtain, develop, and then retain talented players. 43 The
likelihood of the team succeeding will also depend, in large part, on seri-
ous or untimely injuries to key players. To protect against this risk, how-
ever, the Company is insured against having to pay players' salaries in
the event of a player's death, and the Company has obtained insurance
policies for substantially all of its players that are under multi-year
contracts. 44
Another source of the Company's revenue includes the exclusive
right to operate all Jacobs Field's concessions and to receive all revenues
136. Id
137. See id. at 8.
138. See 1998 PROSPECrUS, supra note 128, at 8.
139. See id.
140. Revenue recognized in the first quarter consists primarily of spring training and exhi-
bition games revenues, merchandise sales, concessions, and catering revenues. See iU at 21.
141. See id. at 4.
142. See id
143. See 1998 PROSPECtUs, supra note 128, at 9.
144. See id
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therefrom. 4 ' The Company also controls various forms of advertising
signage, enabling it to coordinate the sale of advertising on the radio, on
the Indians' internet site, in game programs, and throughout Jacobs Field
by selling space on the main and ancillary scoreboards, outfield walls,
and concourses of Jacobs Field.'46 In the future, the agreement address-
ing the naming of Jacobs Field expires in 2013, which may produce addi-
tional revenue for the Company.147 As for merchandising, MLB
Properties manages the licensing of the names, logos, mascots, uniforms,
stadiums, and other marks of all MLB clubs.'48 After payment of an
agency commission to MLB Properties for its services, the net revenues
from such licensing is divided equally among the clubs, not proportion-
ately according to sales.'4 9
Further, the Company warns that "future increases in the [Cleveland
Indians] Club's revenues, operating income and net income, if any, are
likely to be substantially less than those realized over the past five
years."' 50 One reason: the revenue sharing rate, which applies to a
club's net local revenue, was 12% in 1997 and 16% in 1998 and will be
17% in 1999 and 20% in 2000. Once the pool of all clubs' contributions
is accumulated, 75% of the pool is redistributed to the teams equally on
a pro rata basis. "The remaining 25% is distributed to teams whose total
revenue was below the average revenue for all clubs based on the extent
to which that team's revenue was below the average."' 5' In addition,
"[a]lthough the Company has generated net income in the recent past,
the Company has also had periods of significant losses."' 52 Another rea-
son for lesser revenue is the fact that MLB players' salaries have risen
significantly over the past few seasons, 5 3 and there is no reason to think
that the present trend will change. Moreover, clubs that have an actual
season payroll above a specified threshold minimum for that season may
be subject to a luxury tax, although no more than five teams can pay a
145. See id. at 37.
146. See id. at 38.
147. See id. at 44.
148. See 1998 PRosPEctus, supra note 128, at 51.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 4.
151. Id at 48. Moreover, while the Colorado Rockies and Florida Marlins, as expansion
franchises, were exempt from the revenue sharing system for the 1996 and 1997 seasons, the
each began participating in revenue sharing during the 1998 season. The newest expansion
teams, the Arizona Diamondbacks and the Tampa Bay Devil Rays, will also begin participat-
ing in the revenue sharing starting in the 2000 season. See id
152. Id. at 10.
153. See 1998 PRosPEcrus, supra note 128, at 11.
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luxury tax during any given season. 154 The amount of the tax is the dif-
ference between the club's actual payroll and the threshold minimum.155
In 1997, the Indians paid a $2.1 million luxury tax.:5 6
In addition, the Company must compete for entertainment and ad-
vertising dollars with other sports and recreational activities, not the
least of which include professional football (Cleveland Browns of the
NFL), professional basketball (Cleveland Cavaliers of the NBA and the
Cleveland Rockers of the WNBA), and professional hockey (Cleveland
Lumberjacks of the IHL). That is not to say that the Company is not
being proactive in reducing costs and competing. As a small example,
"[t]he Company is in the process of identifying and modifying all signifi-
cant hardware and software applications that will require modification to
ensure Year 2000 Compliance.'1 57
Depending on the Company's success, the Company's operations
may require the periodic infusion of capital. Although the Company in-
tends to finance its operations with cash flow from operations, shortfalls
may require the sale of additional debt or equitable securities,5 " poten-
tially diluting the value of outstanding stock based on a greater
supply.' 59
Another risk associated with the Company rests in labor relations.
For example, MLB has experienced seven work stoppages since 1972,
including a cancellation of the 1994 World Series. 60 Moreover, the cur-
rent labor agreement is set to expire on October 31, 2000 or the last day
of the 2000 World Series, whichever is later.' 6 1 The players do have the
unilateral option to extend the agreement for one additional year.
Similar to the Panthers, another identified risk is that associated with
litigation. In fact, the Indians' prospectus noted that "[t]he Company
and MLB are involved in various lawsuits arising out of the ordinary
course of business."' 6 However, the Company does not discuss these
154. See id. at 48.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. Id. at 33.
158. See 1998 PRosPEcrtus, supra note 128, at 13.
159. Upon completion of the Offering, only 4,139,376 Class A Common Shares, out of
27,000,000 authorized Class A Common Shares, will be outstanding. See id. at 15. In addition,
the Company has reserved 700,000 Class A Common Shares for a Stock Option Plan, which
distributes shared to officers and key employees of the Company who contribute to its man-
agement, growth, and profitability. See id. at 54.
160. See id. at 11.
161. See id.
162. Id. at 44.
[Vol. 9:445
THE LATEST REVENUE GENERATOR
matters in detail, but simply states that it does not expect the outcome of
these matters to have a material impact on the Company's financial
condition. 163
3. The Future
Unlike the Florida Panthers, the Company's opportunities for expan-
sion beyond professional baseball is limited. The "Governing Docu-
ments [of MLB] intend that the Company be a single-purpose entity.' 164
Thus, if the Company's management determined that it is beneficial to
expand into other areas of business, those Documents require the Com-
missioner to approve any such plans before they are placed into effect.
This would not only delay but also has the potential to significantly hin-
der the entire expansion process. That is not to say that the Company
would not consider expansion. "As part of its strategy, the Company
may consider acquisitions of sports-related or non-sports related busi-
nesses as well as commercial properties that complement the Company's
existing operations or that provide the Company with the opportunity to
leverage the capabilities of the management team.' 165 Nevertheless, at
the time of the offering, the Company was not negotiating the acquisi-
tion of any business or property. 66
III. CONCLUSION
So are the stock sales of professional organizations sound invest-
ments or scams? When phrased in that respect, the question is truly a
difficult one that cannot be answered either way. Most stock sales by
professional sports teams are less of a financial investment and more of a
show of support for the team selling the stock. In fact, individuals typi-
cally will get more out of framing the stock certificate and displaying it
on their wall than they will from future financial returns. In that respect,
stock sales resemble personal seat licenses: the team generates revenue
from individuals making a one time investment with little or no expecta-
tion of future returns. The only hope for investors determined to profit
off of owning a sports team as part of their stock portfolio would be
investing in more diversified operations, such as the Florida Panthers.
But, as with other types of financial instruments, along with the possibil-
ity of financial gains come the possibility of financial losses. So what is
163. See 1998 PRosPEcrus, supra note 128, at 44.
164. Id. at 12.
165. Id. at 39.
166. See id.
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the future trend regarding stock sales by professional organizations?
The Packers' Corporation decided to offer additional shares of stock af-
ter considering the great changes in NFL economics since the 1950 sale.
So long as this method of revenue generation is successful, we can expect
teams to join this trend as a new and creative way to gain money and
thereby compete. Teams must, however, keep in mind the hard lesson
learned by the Packers: "there is a limit to Packermania."'16 7
167. Silverstein, supra note 52, at C1.
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